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THE GAME OF  TWO CARS WITH A CONTAINMENT 
PROBABIL ITY  AS  A COST FUNCTION:  
THE CASE OF  VARIABLE  SPEED 
Y. YAVIN and R. DE VILLIERS 
Centre for Advanced Computing and Decision Support, CSIR, P.O. Box 395, Pretoria 0001, South Africa 
Abstraet--A stochastic version of Isaacs's [1] "game of two cars" is dealt with here. In this version the 
pursuer has a variable speed owing to thrust and drag forces, whereas the evader's speed is constant. 
Also, the pursuer can maneuver as long as his speed is bounded by some lower and upper bounds. By 
using a containment probability as a cost functional for the game, saddle-point feedback strategies are 
computed, and it is shown, for a range of values of some parameters, that a proportional navigation 
guidance law is a suboptimal feedback pursuit strategy. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A stochastic pursuit-evasion differential game involving two players, E (the evader) and P (the 
pursuer), moving in the (x, y) plane is considered. The differential game dealt with here is based 
on a noise-perturbed kinematic model. The speed VE of player E is fixed, and his maneuverability 
is determined by his yaw axis lateral acceleration aE = 2EgVEIq~E, where 2E is a given positive 
number, g is the gravitational acceleration and ~bE, ~bE ~ [-- 1, 1], is E's control function. Owing to 
thrust and drag forces, player P has a variable speed Vp. His maneuverability is determined by 
Vp and his yaw lateral acceleration ap-~-,~,pgVlg-lC~bp, where 2p is a given positive number and ~bp, 
~bp~[-1, 1], is P's control function. It is assumed that player P can maneuver as long as 
Vl < Vp < v2, where vl and v2 are given positive numbers. Denote by r(t) the range from P to E 
at the time t. It is assumed that player P has an "operation zone" defined by 0 < r < r0 and 
v~ < Vp < v2; and an "effective operation zone" defined by 0 < r < r0, vl < Vp < v2 and dr/dt ~< -v0, 
where r0 and v0 are given, positive numbers. 
Denote by 2(0  the Lebesgue measure on the real line of the set {s: 0 ~<s ~< t such that 
0 < r(s) < to, vl < Vp(s) < v: and dr(s)/ds ~ - v0}. We say that player P intercepts player E if for 
some t > 0, T] ~< 2(0 ~ T2 and for all s ~[0, t]: 0 < r(s) < r0 and vl < Vp(s) < vs. Here TI and T: 
are given positive numbers. On the other hand, we say that player E escapes from P if: (i) for some 
t i> 0, r(t) = 0 and 2(0  < T], or (ii) for some t >I O, r(t) >t ro and 2(t) < TI, or (iii) for some t >I 0, 
Vp(t) <~ vl or Vp(t) >1 v: or (iv) for some t >t 0, /'2 < 2(0 and for all s E [0, t]: 0 < r(s) < ro and 
v~ < Vp(s) < v2 (this is an indication of a possible malfunction in the operation of P). Thus, this 
game is an extension of Isaacs's [1] "game of two cars". 
Various versions of the "game of two cars" have been applied in past years to model (planar) 
air combat scenarios [2-8], ship-collision avoidance [9, 10], as well as other situations [11-13]. 
In a recent study [14], a stochastic version of the game of two cars has been considered in which 
Vr and Vp are fixed and the following functional (which is a containment probability): 
prob({Tl~<~(t)~<T:[0<r(s)<r0,  for all s6[0, t]}) for some t>0 
has been used as a cost function. Here )~(t) denotes the Lebesgue measure on the real line of the 
set {s: 0~<s ~<t such that O<r(s )<ro  and dr(s)/ds <~ -v0}. It has been found in [14], by 
numerically solving a nonlinear elliptic boundary value problem on a generalized torus in R 4, that 
a proportional navigation guidance law is an optimal feedback pursuit strategy. Using the following 
functional (which is also a containment probability): 
prob({Tj ~<2(t)~< T21 for all s~[O, t ] :O<r(s )<r  o and /)1 • VP(S)<IJ2}), for some t >0 
as a cost function for the differential game dealt with here, the main goal of the study here is to 
establish whether the same proportional navigation guidance law (as the one discussed in [14]) is 
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an optimal or only a suboptimal feedback pursuit strategy. By numerically solving a nonlinear 
elliptic boundary value problem on a generalized torus in R 5, it has been found that for r0 ~< 2000 
one can find values for v0, Tt and T2 such that the above-mentioned proportional navigation 
guidance law is a suboptimal feedback pursuit strategy. 
2. THE EQUATIONS OF MOTION 
Consider the motion of two points, E and P, in the (x, y) plane. It is assumed that the motion 
of player E is given by 
dxE/dt = V E COS 0E, (1) 
dyE/dt = V E sin 0E, (2) 
dOE/dt = ,~,EgVEIt~E, t~EE [ -  1, 1] (3) 
and that the motion of player P is given by 
dxa/dt = Vp cos 0p, (4) 
dyp/dt = Vp sin 0p, (5) 
dOp/dt = 21,gV~lc~p, ~pE[-  1, 1], (6) 
__  2 2 2 -2  d Vp/dt = Ap ki V2 - k2(g2 + j.pg dpp) Vp , (7) 
where (Xe, YE) and (xp, yp) denote the coordinates of players E and P respectively; lie and Vp 
their respective speeds; At, 2p, Ap, kl and k2 are given positive constants, where Ap and 
kl V~, + k2(g 2 + 2~,g2~) Vp -2 represents P's thrust and drag acceleration respectively; ~bs and ~bv are 
E's and P's control functions respectively, and g is the gravitational cceleration. Equations (1)-(7) 
constitute the equations of motion for a "game of two cars" Ill with the pursuer having a variable 
speed. 
By fixing the origin of a new coordinate system at the position occupied by P and considering 
the relative motion of players E and P in polar coordinates, where r is the range from P to E and 
fl the bearing of E from P, we obtain the following equations for r, //, 0r, 0p and Vp: 
dr/dt  = V r CoS(Or -- fl) -- Vp cos(Op -- fl), (8) 
dfl/dt = r -  ~[VE sin(Or - fl) - Vp sin(Or - fl)], (9) 
dOr/dt = 2rg V~ t q~ E, (10) 
dOp/dt = 2pgVf  I~bp, (11) 
= Vp - k2g (2pOp + I)Vf 2. (12) d Vp/dt Av -k  I 2 2 2 2 
Denote xl,=r, x2,=Or - fl, x3,=Op - fl, x4,= l/p, and assume that E's and P's motion is perturbed 
by Gaussian white noises that model the time-dependent random errors in the aerodynamical 
coefficients (based on measurements) and the random influence of the environment. Then, 
equations (8)-(12) yield 
dx Jdt  = Vr cos x2 - x4 cos X 3 "di- 0" dWi/dt ,  (13) 
dx:/dt = 2rgV~lOr - x ?l(Vr sin x2 - x4 sin x3) + trx ? I dW2/dt, (14) 
dx3/dt = 2pgxflOp - x ? I(VE sin x2 - x4 sin x3) + ox i -I d W3/dt, (15) 
dx,/dt  = Ap - k,x24 - k2g2(A~dp~ + 1)x~ 2 + y~ dW,/dt ,  (16) 
where lg: = { l~:(t) = (Wl(t) ,  W2(t), W3(t), W4(t)), t i> 0} is an R4-valued standard Wiener process 
and a and Yl are given numbers, 0 < 0 ,~ VE and 0 < ~,:1 '~ Ap. 
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Denote $ = (x~, x2, x3, x4), ¢ = (q~E, ~b~), and assume that for some ¢ = ¢(2)  equations (13)-(16) 
have a solution (see the next section for a rigorous definition of a solution to a set of stochastic 
differential equations), denoted here by 
x * = {2¢(t) = (x~(t), x~(t), x~(t), x[(t)), t >~ 0}. 
The "effective operation zone" of player P, Cr, defined by the relations: 0 < r < to, dr/dt <. -Vo 
and v~ < lip < v2, is redefined and is given in the 2-coordinate system by 
Ce,= { f : O < xl < ro, Ve cos xz - X4 COS X3 <. - Vo and v~<x~<v2}. (17) 
Define the following function and random process respectively: 
/Cp(2),=~! i f2  •C~ (18) 
(o otherwise, 
and 
2*(t).'= lcp(2~'(s)) ds, t >10. (19) 
Then, 2*(t) is the Lebesgue measure on the real line of the set 
{s:O<<.s<<.t and 2*(s)•Cp}. 
We say that player E has been intercepted by player P if for some t > 0, TI ~< 2*(t) ~< T2 and for 
all s •[0, t]: 0 < x((s)  < to, and vl < x$(s) < v2. On the other hand, we say that player E has escaped 
from player P if: (i) for some t >1 O, x~(t) = 0 and 2*(t) < TI, or (ii) for some t >>. O, x~(t) >t ro and 
2*(t) < TI, or (iii) for some t >1 O, x~4(t) <<. vl or x[(t)  >i v2, or (iv) for some t > 0, T2 < 2*(t) and 
for all s •[0, t]: 0 < x((s)  < ro and vl < x~4(s) < v2. 
3. FORMULATION OF THE PROBLEM 
In the sequel the following set of stochastic differential equations will serve as the model for the 
motion of players E and P: 
dxt =[VECOSX2--x4cosx3]dt +a  dWi, t >0,  
dx2 = [2egVf f l~bE(X)  - -  I(x)x~-I(VE sin x2 -- x4 sin x3)] dt + aJ (x)x i  -I dW2, t > 0, 
dx3 = I(x)[ApgxZtCe(x) - x~-I(Ve sin x2 - x4 sin x3)] dt + aJ(x)x~ -I dW3, t > 0, 
where 
dx4 = [Ap -- I (x)(klx~ + krg2(2~,¢~,(x) + l)x~-2)] dt + Yt dW4, 
dxs=Ic (x )dt  + y2dl¥5, t>0,  
x = (x~, x2, x3, xa, Xs); 
C,={x:O<xl  <ro, (x2,x3)•R 2,vl <x4<v2 
t >0,  
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
Ic(x) = 1, if x • C, and lc(x) = 0 otherwise; Y2 is a given number, 0 < 72 '~ 1 and the process W 5 
has been chosen in such a manner that W = {W(t )= (Wl(t), W2(t), Wa(t), W4(t), Ws(t)), t t> 0} is 
an RS-valued standard Wiener process. 
The number Y2 and the functions 1 and J are introduced here to guarantee the existence of 
solutions to equations (20)-(24) over the whole of R 5. In fact, we are interested in these solutions 
only over a set Do, Do c •5, which will be defined later. Thus, we take I (x)  = 1 if e ~< xl ~< r0 + e 
and vl ~< x4 ~< v2, and I (x)  = 0 otherwise; and J is chosen in such a manner such that J (x )  = 1 for 
e <<. x~ <~ ro + e; J (x )x?  ~ is continuous on R 5 and satisfies 0 < e0 ~< j2(x)x?2 ~< M < ~ for all x • R s 
and for some e0, M and e, 0 < e ,~ 1. 
Denote by U0 the class of all feedback strategies ¢ = (¢E, Sp) = {(~b~(x), Sp(x)), x • R 5} such that 
¢: Rs-~R 2 is measurable and ICe(x)/~< 1 and [¢p(x)l ~< 1 for all x•a  5. 
Let ¢•U0.  Then, [15], equations (20)-(24) determine a stochastic process (~={($( t )= 
(~l(t), ~2(t), (~3(t), (~4(t), (~5(t)), t I> 0}, (x¢(0) = x, such that (x ~ is a weak solution (in the sense 
and VEcosx2--x4cosx3<~--Vo}; (25) 
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of [15]) to equations (20)-(24) associated with a family {P~, x e R 5} of probability measures, and 
such that {(~, P~), x e R 5} is a family of strong Markov processes. Furthermore, the weak 
infinitesimal operator of this family is given by 
.~(~)V(x) = [V~ cos  x~ - x ,  cos  x3] OV(x)/Ox~ 
+ [2Eg Vff t(~r(x) -- I(x)x ~- t( V E sin x2 - x4 sin x3)] O V(x )/Ox2 
+ I(x)[2~gxZ~qbp(x) - x ~-~( VE sin x~ -- x4 sin x3)] O V(x)/Ox3 
+ [A~ -- I(x)(k,x ] + k~g2(A2dp2(x) + 1)x42)] OV(x)/Ox4 + Ic(x) dV(x)/Ox 5
+ (tr 2/2)[02 V(x)/Ox~ + j2(x)x 72(02 V(x)/Ox 2 , + ~2 V(x)/Ox~) 
+ (y~/tr ~) d2V(x)/dx] + (7 ~/tr 2) O2V(x)/Ox~], (26) 
for any V ~ Cg(Ns). 
Define the following sets in Ns: 
D0.'={x: 0 < x~ < r0, (X2, X3)~ ~2, /)1 < X4 < V2,0 < X 5 < T 2 a t- ~}, (27) 
K.={x eDo: ~ ~< x~ ~< ro - ~, v~ + ~ ~< x4 ~< v2 - ~, T~ ~< xs ~< T2}, (28) 
B,={x:x~=O, orx~>~ro, orx4<~vt, orxa>~v2, orxs<~O, orxs>~T2+~ }, (29) 
Co:={x~C:O<x5 <Tz+~}, 0<~,~1,  (30) 
and 
D:=Do - K. (31) 
Note that now Do and Co are respectively the "operation zone" and the "effective operation zone" 
of player P. The set K is the "capture set" of P, and the set B is the "safe zone" of E. Thus, 
if for some t >. O, ~$(t)~K, then player E is intercepted by P, whereas if for some t >. O, ~$(t)eB, 
then player E escapes from P. The game terminates at the first t >t 0 that player E is either 
intercepted or escapes, and we disregard the subsequent motion. 
Denote by x (x; ~) the first exit time of ~$ from D (see [16] for the definition of the first exit time), 
and define the following class of admissible feedback strategies: 
u,={~ = (¢~, ~p)~ u0: sup E~*~(x; ~,) < oo}, (32) 
xED 
where E~ denotes the expectation operator with respect to P~. Also, define the following 
functional: 
V(x; t~).'=P~({~(T (x; ~)) e K}) 
= P~({for some t, 0 ~< t < vB(x; ~b): T~ ~< ~5(t) ~< T2}), ~b e U, x ~ R 5, (33) 
where zB(x; q~) is the first time t, t >I 0, that ~x ° enters the set B. In other words, V(x; ~) is the 
probability of player P intercepting player E before E leaves P's "operation zone". 
The problem dealt with in this paper is: find a feedback strategy 4~* = (~b e*, ~b ~')• U such that 
V(x; (4~*, ~p)) <~ V(x; (a*) <. V(x; (~bE, 4~*)) for any (~b[', ~bp), (0E, 4~*)e U and all x eD. (34) 
The strategy ~ * is here called a saddle-point feedback strategy, ~* is called an optiraalfeedback 
evasion strategy, and ~b* is called an optimal feedback pursuit strategy. 
Note that the problem posed in this section, which is based on equations (20)-(24), differs from 
the problem posed in the previous ections for the following reason. Let ~b e U. Then equation (24) 
yields 
~5(t) --- x5 + 2#(t) + y2Ws(t), t >1 O, (24) 
where x5 = ~5(0) is here chosen to satisfy xs >I 0. The real number x5 is here interpreted as the 
Lebesgue measure of the set {s: - T ~< s ~< 0, ~'~(s) - (~j(s), ~2(s), ~3(s), ~(s ) )e  Cp}, and the 
process ~.~ is defined as the weak solution (in the sense of [15]) to equations (20)--(23) on the interval 
[ -  T, 0), for a given 0 < T < oo. Thus, in the problem posed in this section, it is assumed that until 
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t = 0, the instant at which we assume that the game begins, player E has already spent some time 
in the set C. Also, note that 72 can be taken to be very small, and thus 72 W5 can be neglected for 
all practical purposes. 
4. COMPUTATION OF FEEDBACK STRATEGIES 
Let ~ denote the class of all functions V : Rs~R such that V is continuous on the closure/~0 
of Do, twice continuously differentiable on D, and such that Ae(q~) V e L~(D0 f'l A0) for any ~b ~ U, 
where 
Ao,={x: -r~ ~<x2~<n and -n  ~<x3 ~< re}. 
By following the same procedure as in [16], it 
be found by solving the following problem: 
~(ck)V(x )  = o, x 
v (x )  = 1, x 
V (x )  = o, x 
V(XI, in +jh2, x3, x4, Xs) = V(x,, 
V(x 1, x 2, ix +jh 3, x4, xs) = V(xl, 
and 
Remark 
Define 
follows that a saddle-point feedback strategy ~b * may 
D fq Ao; 
eK;  
~B; 
- in +jh2, x3, x4, Xs), 
x2, - in + jh3, x4, xs), 
0~<h2~<n, 0~h3~<n, i=- l ,1  and 
¢be(x) = -sign(OV(x)/Ox2), x ~D; 
(Xl, X3, X4, Xs)~ R': 
(Xl, Xz, X4, X~) ~ R 4 
j=0 ,  i; 
~p(x) = a{~n~ax (z 0 V(x)/&3 - z2k22pgx; ' 0 V(x)/&D, x ~ D. 
B (x),= (x4 0 V(x)/Ox3)l(2k22pg 0 V(x)lax4). 
Then, equation (39) is equivalent o 
For OV(x)/dx4 >I 0 
~sign(O V(x )/Ox3) 
cb~(x) = (S (x )  
(35) 
(36) 
(37) 
(38) 
otherwise 
(39) 
Cp(x) = sign (0 V(x)/Ox3). 
(40) 
if [B(x)l I> 1 
(41) 
if IB(x)] < 1, 
(42) 
Assume that equations (35)-(39) [or equations (35)-(38) and (41) and (42)] have a solution 
denoted here by (q~*, V('; ~b*)). If ~b* = (~b*, ~bp*)e U and V(.; ~*)e~,  then ~b* is a saddle-point 
strategy. 
In order to assess the performance of the optimal feedback pursuit strategy ~b*, we have here 
solved equations (35)-(38) where ~bp is given by 
:sign(BpN(x)) if IBPN(x)I >I 1 
,~p(x) = [BpN(x) if [BpN(x)[ < 1, (43) 
where 
BpN(x ),= A x4x ~-:( VE sin x2 -- x4 sin x3)/( Apg ), (44) 
and A is a given positive number. 
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Table I. The values of P~(O), ~ = ~*, ~#, as functions of k:, for A = 4, 5, v0 ffi 200, r0 = 600, 
T I = 3, 7"2 = 4, h~ = 60, h~ = hs = n/10, h4 = 50 and hs = 0.25. Here N(h)= 493,920 
k s e~'(q~*) A = 4; pt,(q~,v) A = 5; Ph((k~') A = 4; (Ph(~b*) - P~(dp~))/P~(¢k~) 
600 0.35201 0.33794 0.33743 0.04163 
800 0.35014 0.33522 0.33474 0.04451 
1000 0.34906 0.33303 0.33256 0.04813 
Table 2. The values of P~(~), ~b = ~*, ~b N, as functions of k~, for A = 4, 5, vo = 200, ro = 900, 
Tl=2ro/(vo+VE+V~), T:=Tt+I ,  h~=90, h~=h3=n/lO, h4=50 and h5=0.25. Here 
N(h ) = 308,700 
k~ Pk(q~*) a = 4; P~(~b to) A = 5; p~(q~:v) A = 4; (P*(q~*) -- p~(~pN))/ph(~:¢) 
600 0.58947 0.55507 0.55354 0.06197 
800 0.58233 0.54860 0.54712 0.06148 
1000 0.57799 0.54357 0.54212 0.06332 
Note that BpN(x),~(AVpdfl/dt)/(2pg), that is, the feedback pursuit strategy ~bp given by 
equations (43) and (44) is a proportional navigation guidance law. Such a version of proportional 
navigation is applied, for example in [17] and [18] (where the 3-D version is given). 
Assume that equations (35)--(38) and (43) and (44) have a solution (~b ~, V(.; ~s), V(.; ~bs)e~ 
and ~= (~b~, ~b~)~ U. Then (see, for example, [16]) 
V(. ;~b ~) = Px ({(x (z(x; q~))eK}), x e~ ~. (45) 
5. A NUMERICAL STUDY 
Denote by R] the following finite-difference grid on Rs: 
R~h,={(ih,,jh2, kh3, lh,, mhs): i,j, k, 1, m = 0, + 1, -I-2 . . . .  }. (46) 
Define D0:=D0 f3 A0 N R~. Equations (35)-(39), or equations (35)-(38) and (43) and (44), have here 
been solved using an upwind finite-difference method on R~ similar to that described in [19]. 
Denote by Vh( • ; ~b *) and Vh(" ; ~ :¢) the solutions to the finite-difference quations corresponding 
to equations (35)--(39), or (35)-(38) and (43) and (44), respectively. 
Computations were carried out using the following set of parameters: r0 = 600, 900, 1500, 2000, 
3000; VE = 300, 2E = 6, 2p = 30, Vl = 300, V 2 = 700, Ap = 60, kt = 10 -4, k2 = 600, 800, 1000; a 2 = 16, 
~= 10 -2, ~= 10 -I°, A =4,  5; and v0=200, 300. 
Define 
ph(~),= ~ V(ih,,jh2, kh3, lh4, mhs; ok)IN(h) c~ = d?*, dp N, (47) 
(ih I ,jh2. kh3, lh4. mhs) ~ Doh 
where N(h)denotes the number of points in D0h. Some extracts from the numerical results obtained 
are presented in Tables 1-5. 
Table 3. The values of P~(~b), q~ = ~*,  ~b s, as functions of k2, for A = 4, 5, vo = 300, r o = 1500, 
Tl=2ro/(vo+VE+v2), 7"2=T~+3,  h i= IS0 ,  h 2=h 3=n/10,  h4=50 and ho=0.25. Here 
N(h) = 648,270 
k: P/'(~b*) A : 4; ph(~N) A : 5; Pt'(0N) A : 4; (Pl'(~b*) - P*(dp'))/PI'(Lp N) 
600 0.62735 0.60264 0.60115 0.04100 
800 0.61957 0.59830 0.59685 0.03555 
1000 0.61626 0.59513 0.59371 0.03550 
Table 4. The values of ph(O), ~ = ~,, 0N, as functions of k s, for 
A =4, Vo=300, r0=2000, Tl=2ro/(Ve+vo+V2), T2=Tt+3.5, 
hl "200 ,  h 2 - h 3 = n/lO, h 4 = 50 and h s - 0.25. Here N(h  ) = 802,620 
Table 5. The values of ph(o), ~ = O,,ON, as functions of k 2, for 
A ffi 4, v o ffi 300, r o ffi 3000, T, ffi 2ro](V o+ V e + v2), T 2 ffi TI + 4, h I ffi 
300, h 2 ~ h 3 = rt/10, h 4 ffi 50 and h s ffi 0.25. Here N(h) = 1,049,580 
k 2 Pk(O*) Pk(oN ) (Ph(O*) -- ph(oN))/pk(~O'V ) k 2 Pk(O* ) Pk(ON ) (Pk(O*) -- ph(o~))/pk(o~ ) 
600 0.61343 0.57378 0.06910 600 0.60041 0.51707 0.16118 
800 0.59943 0.56830 0.05478 800 0.56930 0.50875 0.11902 
I000 0.59265 0.56448 0.04990 1000 0.55211 0.50333 0.09691 
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Table 6. The values of ph($,) and Ph(dpN), as functions of k2, for 
A = 4, t, o = 50, r 0 ffi 3000, Tj ffi Tj(x) and T2 = T2(x) are given by 
equations (48), hj = 300, h2 = ha = rt/10, h4 = 50 and h 5 = 0.25. Here 
N(h) = 467,019. 
k2 ph(¢,) p~(¢.) (eh(¢,) _ e~(¢ s))/ph(¢ s) 
600 0.99999 0.76536 0.30656 
800 0.95983 0.72030 0.33254 
1000 0.92983 0.68882 0.34989 
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6. AN EXTENSION OF  THE GAME 
The problem dealt with in the previous ections can be extended to cases where Tt = Tt(x) and 
T2 = T2(x). One case in which Tl(x) and T2(x ) are given by 
Tt(x) = 2xt/(Vo + VE + X4), T2(X) = T~(x) + 1, (48) 
has been studied here. The results are presented in Table 6. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
The numerical results obtained, part of which are presented in Tables 1-6, suggest he following 
conclusions: 
(i) For r0 ~< 2000, one can find (fixed) vlaues for T~, T2 and v0 such that ~b~, the proportional 
navigation guidance law, will serve as a suboptimal feedback pursuit strategy. Comparing the 
results of the study carried out here with the results obtained in [14], it follows that the assumption 
made there that Vp is fixed, is crucial to the question whether ~b~' [the proportional navigation 
guidance law given here by equations (43) and (44)] is an optimal feedback pursuit strategy, as 
turned out to be the case there, or only a suboptimal feedback pursuit strategy, for some values 
of the parameters, as was found here. 
(ii) By comparing the results presented in Table 6 with those presented in Tables 1-5, one can 
see that the values of the cost function of the game are very sensitive to the values of Tj and/'2. 
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